#### 2,000 Websites Later Which Web Programming Languages are Most Secure?

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- WhiteHat Security Founder & Chief Technology Officer
- 2010 RSA Security Bloggers Award (Best Corporate Blog)
- InfoWorld's CTO Top 25 (2007)
- 5th most popular "Jeremiah" according to Google
- Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu Brown Belt
- Narcissistic Vulnerability Pimp
- Former Yahoo! information security officer







## WhiteHat Security

- 350+ enterprise customers
  Start-ups to Fortune 500
- Flagship offering "WhiteHat Sentinel Service"
  1000's of assessments performed annually
- Recognized leader in website security
  Quoted thousands of times by the mainstream press



Deloitte. 2008 Technology Fast 50 Silicon Valley





### WhiteHat Sentinel

Complete Website Vulnerability Management Customer Controlled & Expert Managed

- Unique SaaS-based solution Highly scalable delivery of service at a fixed cost
- Production Safe No Performance Impact
- Full Coverage On-going testing for business logic flaws and technical vulnerabilities – uses WASC 24 classes of attacks as reference point
- Unlimited Assessments Anytime websites change
- Eliminates False Positives Security Operations Team verifies all vulnerabilities
- Continuous Improvement & Refinement Ongoing updates and enhancements to underlying technology and processes



### Website Classes of Attacks

#### **Technical:** Automation Can Identify

#### **Command Execution**

- Buffer Overflow
- Format String Attack
- LDAP Injection
- OS Commanding
- SQL Injection
- SSI Injection
- XPath Injection

#### **Information Disclosure**

- Directory Indexing
- Information Leakage
- Path Traversal
- Predictable Resource Location

#### **Client-Side**

- Content Spoofing
- Cross-site Scripting
  - **HTTP Response Splitting\***



#### Business Logic: <u>Humans Required</u> Authentication

- Brute Force
- Insufficient Authentication
- Weak Password Recovery Validation
- CSRF\*

#### **Authorization**

- Credential/Session Prediction
- Insufficient Authorization
- Insufficient Session Expiration
- Session Fixation

#### **Logical Attacks**

- Abuse of Functionality
- Denial of Service
- Insufficient Anti-automation
- Insufficient Process Validation

## Profit or goal driven (\$\$\$) Directed Opportunistic



- Unauthenticated scans
- Targets chosen indiscriminately

Directed Opportunistic
Commercial and Open Source Tools

Authentication scans

**Random Opportunistic** 

**Fully Targeted (APT?)** 

Multi-step processes (forms)

# Customize their own tools Focused on business logic Profit or goal driven (\$\$\$)

**Attacker Targeting** 





WhiteHat Sentinel

**STANDARD EDITION** 



### **Evolution of Expectations**

1. Quantity phase -- where more is more

2. Quality phase -- where less is more

3. Actionable phase -- how do I fix/improve things going forward with this data?


4. **Consistency phase** -- how do I do this consistently across time, because my software is always changing, without spending a zillion hours doing it?



## **Vulnerability Overlap**

#### What's a website?

Websites, which may be a collection of multiple web servers and hostnames, often utilize more than one programming language or framework. As such, a single website may contain vulnerabilities with multiple different extensions.



#### **Data Overview**

- 1,659 total websites
- 24,286 verified custom web application vulnerabilities
- Data collected from January 1, 2006 to March 25, 2010
- Vast majority of websites assessed for vulnerabilities weekly
- Vulnerabilities classified according to WASC Threat Classification, the most comprehensive listing of Web application vulnerabilities
- Vulnerability severity naming convention aligns with PCI-DSS
- Contrasted and compared ASP Classic, .NET, Cold Fusion, Struts, Java Server Pages, PHP, and Perl.


	ASP	ASPX	CFM	DO	JSP	PHP	PL
Average # of inputs (attack surface) per website	470	484	457	569	919	352	588
Average ratio of vulnerability count / number of inputs	8.7%	6.2%	8.4%	6.3%	9.8%	8.1%	11.6%

## Key Findings

	ASP	ASPX	CFM	DO	JSP	PHP	PL
Websites <u>having had</u> at least one serious* vulnerability	74%	73%	86%	77%	80%	80%	88%
Websites <u>currently with</u> at least one serious* vulnerability	57%	58%	54%	56%	59%	63%	75%
Avg. # of serious* vulnerabilities per website during the WhiteHat Sentinel assessment lifetime	25	18.7	34.3	19.9	25.8	26.6	44.8
Avg. # of serious* severity unresolved vulnerabilities per website	8.9	6.2	8.6	5.5	9.6	8.3	11.8



### **Top Ten Classes of Attack**



### Time-to-Fix (Days)




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### **Resolution Rates by Severity**

Class of Attack	Severity	ASP	ASPX	CFM	DO	JSP	PHP	PL
SQL Injection	Urgent	70%	72%	66%	79%	58%	70%	71%
Insufficient Authorization	Urgent	21%	45%	46%	20%	25%	18%	10%
Directory Traversal	Urgent	43%	20%	67%	0%	33%	32%	16%
Cross Site Scripting	Urgent	100%	0%	100%	0%	0%	50%	0%
Cross-Site Scripting	Critical	51%	57%	50%	51%	52%	66%	54%
Cross-Site Request Forgery	Critical	18%	34%	17%	27%	39%	57%	27%
Session Fixation	Critical	19%	18%	0%	36%	50%	50%	100%
Abuse of Functionality	Critical	76%	23%	82%	38%	57%	59%	97%
Insufficient Authentication	Critical	55%	37%	0%	33%	71%	0%	100%
Information Leakage	High	32%	34%	57%	49%	45%	39%	29%
Content Spoofing	High	31%	30%	43%	37%	44%	46%	69%
Predictable Resource Loc.	High	29%	64%	85%	64%	53%	56%	29%
HTTP Response Splitting	High	28%	24%	33%	10%	36%	42%	35%
Directory Indexing	High	33%	56%	40%	25%	27%	33%	18%
TOTAL		65%	67%	75%	72%	63%	69%	74%

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#### Technology in Use





### Lessons & Observations

You can't secure what you don't know you own – Inventory Web applications to gain visibility into what data is at risk and where attackers can exploit the money or data transacted.

**Assign a champion** – Designate someone who can own and drive data security and is strongly empowered to direct numerous teams for support. Without accountability, security, and compliance, will suffer.

**Don't wait for developers to take charge of security** – Deploy shielding technologies to mitigate the risk of vulnerable Web applications.





#### I was not in your threat model.

1:53 PM Apr 28th via TweetDeck Retweeted by 1 person



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